North Korea vows to tear up Korean War ceasefire.

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Agema:

J Tyran:

Thats the problem the Chinese face and the one that prevents them from really considering a nuclear war. They could either attempt to destroy some Cities and leave the US military almost entirely intact, still facing a retaliatory strike. Or they could try and wipe out as many of the critical conventional US assets leaving the nation and a bulk if its reserve materiel and manpower intact and still face a retaliatory strike.

The US would never choose to face it but they are far more prepared to step over the line if forced upon them than many people would realize, some of the Cold War doctrine proves that. The US could go on after such a war with China, China would be finished and likely uninhabitable for many millenia.

China would not initiate nuclear war against the USA for the same reason the USA would not do the same to China. You need an ideological obsessive, madman or intolerable threat to start a nuclear war, and a leader would need to be forced into the last of those three. There's no good evidence that China's leadership are anything less than pragmatic.

The point being that for either country, it's nothing but a huge lose-lose for everyone involved. That China would be even more devastated than the USA is besides the point.

Very true, its unlikely either of them would choose a nuclear war. The main risk is of escalation if one of the sides tried tactical strikes during a conflict. Both the US and China might see them as viable options, the US have a huge and tactical superior Navy and the Chinese have huge infantry forces. The Chinese might attempt to destroy a carrier battle group for instance and US might want to avoid being swamped by ground forces.

Tactics like these where discussed and planned by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, they might resurface in any potential conflict. The other potential cause is the use of chemical or biological weapons, Britain took nukes to the Falklands and the US planned tactical nuclear strikes in both Iraq wars as contingencies against there use. If North Korea used its stockpiles of nerve agents it might provoke a nuclear response which China may feel can only be responded too in kind. Even still I think any conflict between the US and China is hard to take seriously, if I was to speculate I would say it may be more likely that China would take care of North Korea itself to avoid the risk of a North Korea+China Vs South Korea+US war.

That way they could instigate regime change that would see the Country rebuilt and then build a true ally rather than have an unpredictable paper tiger of a nation on its border. You are right about China being pragmatic, I should have been clearer that I agree. I do not beleive at all that they are red madman that want any kind of war, let alone a nuclear war any more than most Nations. My original comment was mainly to illustrate that they would come off worse in a strategic nuclear exchange, which in itself shows how China is more sensible than some. They built enough nukes to be a deterrent or for use in a tactical exchange, just like a lot of other Countries. Only the US and Russia went bonkers and built enough to incinerate the world several times over.

Quaxar:

Now let's not forget the DPRK has 700 artillery cannon bunkers pointing at Seoul ready to fire. But Seoul has its own artillery and can retaliate within minutes. Also note that, considering the Yeonpyong Do incident in 2010, the dud rate for their outdated artillery batteries (their newest one is the self-built M-1992 120mm, but some of their pieces go back all the way to the 50s) was about 25%, then 25% of those 700 artilleries would be held back as a reserve, the simple fact that their ammunition resupply is awful and the estimate that the immediate reaction of defense forces will take out one gun per hour, probably even more once the US gets their big toys going, it's looking a lot better than the North would like.
Also note that 70% of foreigners in the Seoul area are Chinese, including diplomats, high-ranking party-members' family and company headquarters, so the Chinese gouvernment would most likely not be thrilled to join the DPRK.

I think you are understating the effectiveness of the North Korean Artillery on Seoul.

Every person I've encountered that served in Korea after 2000 said that you should assume within 30 minutes of the start of the conflict is to assume that the majority of the population in Seoul (A city with over 10 million inhabitants) is dead. Assume that most of the US bases have been overrun by NK troops outnumbering US forces 5 to 1. They will likely travel by tunnel.

aelreth:

Quaxar:

Now let's not forget the DPRK has 700 artillery cannon bunkers pointing at Seoul ready to fire. But Seoul has its own artillery and can retaliate within minutes. Also note that, considering the Yeonpyong Do incident in 2010, the dud rate for their outdated artillery batteries (their newest one is the self-built M-1992 120mm, but some of their pieces go back all the way to the 50s) was about 25%, then 25% of those 700 artilleries would be held back as a reserve, the simple fact that their ammunition resupply is awful and the estimate that the immediate reaction of defense forces will take out one gun per hour, probably even more once the US gets their big toys going, it's looking a lot better than the North would like.
Also note that 70% of foreigners in the Seoul area are Chinese, including diplomats, high-ranking party-members' family and company headquarters, so the Chinese gouvernment would most likely not be thrilled to join the DPRK.

I think you are understating the effectiveness of the North Korean Artillery on Seoul.

Every person I've encountered that served in Korea after 2000 said that you should assume within 30 minutes of the start of the conflict is to assume that the majority of the population in Seoul (A city with over 10 million inhabitants) is dead. Assume that most of the US bases have been overrun by NK troops outnumbering US forces 5 to 1. They will likely travel by tunnel.

The former, maybe, but the later? No. US military is very prepared for direct attacks against them by big forces. Being outnumbered five to one means nothing if one side has more machine guns, artillery, and better soldiers hunkered down in defensive positions.

J Tyran:
=
Very true, its unlikely either of them would choose a nuclear war. The main risk is of escalation if one of the sides tried tactical strikes during a conflict. Both the US and China might see them as viable options, the US have a huge and tactical superior Navy and the Chinese have huge infantry forces. The Chinese might attempt to destroy a carrier battle group for instance and US might want to avoid being swamped by ground forces.

Fundamentally, I think China and the USA would not go to war under any circumstances, nuclear or conventional. Furthermore, I am sure that in the event of NK-SK conflict, they would also make clear in advance what they considered acceptable for the other to do, and they would largely abide by each other's limitations (including use of nukes). They likely already have such an arrangement - you do not engage in conflict in the backyard of a major power without knowing how it feels about it first.

Key to this is that I strongly believe China does not like, support, or want NK in its current state, and hasn't for a long time. It's just a problem regime for China as it is to everyone else. I would suspect China's optimal scenario would be to effect a regime change in NK and turn it into a modernised, China-leaning ally. Thus it might even de facto assist the USA/SK, if that is the best way to achieve that.

Agema:

J Tyran:
=
Very true, its unlikely either of them would choose a nuclear war. The main risk is of escalation if one of the sides tried tactical strikes during a conflict. Both the US and China might see them as viable options, the US have a huge and tactical superior Navy and the Chinese have huge infantry forces. The Chinese might attempt to destroy a carrier battle group for instance and US might want to avoid being swamped by ground forces.

Fundamentally, I think China and the USA would not go to war under any circumstances, nuclear or conventional. Furthermore, I am sure that in the event of NK-SK conflict, they would also make clear in advance what they considered acceptable for the other to do, and they would largely abide by each other's limitations (including use of nukes). They likely already have such an arrangement - you do not engage in conflict in the backyard of a major power without knowing how it feels about it first.

Key to this is that I strongly believe China does not like, support, or want NK in its current state, and hasn't for a long time. It's just a problem regime for China as it is to everyone else. I would suspect China's optimal scenario would be to effect a regime change in NK and turn it into a modernised, China-leaning ally. Thus it might even de facto assist the USA/SK, if that is the best way to achieve that.

I think if this keeps on China might intervene with North Korea itself, its just a problem and the alliance has zero benefit for China. At the moment they have a paper tiger regime thats being a constant problem in international politics, China might want to change that and rebuild the nation and have a proper ally on the Korean peninsula.

I said as much in the rest of the post you cherry picked the quote from, China does not want a huge destructive war. You can see as much in their military, no huge move or investment towards force projection and other little details. Their economy is largely driven by industry and consumer goods, why would you want a war with your customers? Most of the worlds gadgets like iPads, Xboxes and even South Korean firms like Samsung have their flagship Galaxy S3 manufactured in China.

You do not hold your customers at gun point.

aelreth:

Quaxar:

Now let's not forget the DPRK has 700 artillery cannon bunkers pointing at Seoul ready to fire. But Seoul has its own artillery and can retaliate within minutes. Also note that, considering the Yeonpyong Do incident in 2010, the dud rate for their outdated artillery batteries (their newest one is the self-built M-1992 120mm, but some of their pieces go back all the way to the 50s) was about 25%, then 25% of those 700 artilleries would be held back as a reserve, the simple fact that their ammunition resupply is awful and the estimate that the immediate reaction of defense forces will take out one gun per hour, probably even more once the US gets their big toys going, it's looking a lot better than the North would like.
Also note that 70% of foreigners in the Seoul area are Chinese, including diplomats, high-ranking party-members' family and company headquarters, so the Chinese gouvernment would most likely not be thrilled to join the DPRK.

I think you are understating the effectiveness of the North Korean Artillery on Seoul.

Every person I've encountered that served in Korea after 2000 said that you should assume within 30 minutes of the start of the conflict is to assume that the majority of the population in Seoul (A city with over 10 million inhabitants) is dead. Assume that most of the US bases have been overrun by NK troops outnumbering US forces 5 to 1. They will likely travel by tunnel.

Always assuming the worst is probably good for the common soldier but please show me any tactical analysis pointing that way.

Why the heck would the Seoulians (?) stand around in an artillery bombing and look at all the pretty shells for half an hour? The Seoul area has bunkers that can hold approximately 60% of the area's population and they are well maintained and not exactly a secret. And while Seoul is pretty close to the DMZ it is actually far enough away that only the DPRK's biggest artillery and MLRs can reach it and by far not all of them are positioned along the DMZ since that would leave a huge border open. And retaliation fire from ROK artillery ready in minutes slows their already slow rate of fire even more down.
Only going by artillery and ignoring ballistic missiles and the like of course.

Also, while the DPRK has built tunnels since the 70s that could provide a route for a few thousand KPA soldiers per hour and there are believed to be several unknown ones left it's not like they can have a successful invasion just because their infantry can circumvent the minefield. None of the four known ones are big enough to allow passage for any vehicles for example. And since it is know there are probably more South Korea constantly drills around the DMZ to find more and has set up seismological instruments to discover further ones as they are being built.

Where do you get 5:1? Considering the DPRK has 1 million while at agreement with the ROK the standing USFK are no more than 28,500 it's more of a 1:35 ratio. Still, comparing armies in pure numbers or pretending like without the small local US forces the South would fall like a drunk tightrope walking bear isn't really modern. The North fails on pretty much all areas vital for modern combat and especially advancing into enemy territory, except of course having more people to waste.
And I dare say I trust military tactical analysts more than heresay over five corners.

Quaxar:
Also, while the DPRK has built tunnels since the 70s that could provide a route for a few thousand KPA soldiers per hour and there are believed to be several unknown ones left it's not like they can have a successful invasion just because their infantry can circumvent the minefield. None of the four known ones are big enough to allow passage for any vehicles for example. And since it is know there are probably more South Korea constantly drills around the DMZ to find more and has set up seismological instruments to discover further ones as they are being built.

I read a paper by a US Major Allen Reece (looking for tactical information on tunnel warfare, only found strategic), written in 1997 about this.

He decided that the tunnels will give the NK forces an initial advantage, but they aren't a game winner, and would fairly soon will be countered by ROK and US forces. The defenders will not know where the attackers will emerge, which is a real problem, but once they've been committed revealed, the advantage has been lost.

He also says that's there seems to be doctrinal weakness in the US military about tunnel warfare (might have been corrected by now), and that they really don't want to try fighting in the tunnels themselves (can't see why they'd try that, myself).

While the NK will likely not try anything (especially not if China tugs hard on the leash), finally getting rid of the NK problem will be a big issue for the US. Because it seems many people in the US have forgotten what it cost us the last time we had to kill a god; untold lives, resources and ultimately required using the most powerful weapon yet deployed by man twice.

And since no major power on the planet, save for maybe China and Russia, have the will or the stomach to commit to total and effective war anymore any conflict with NK will make Iraq and Vietnam look like a playground shoving match by comparison.

thaluikhain:

Quaxar:
Also, while the DPRK has built tunnels since the 70s that could provide a route for a few thousand KPA soldiers per hour and there are believed to be several unknown ones left it's not like they can have a successful invasion just because their infantry can circumvent the minefield. None of the four known ones are big enough to allow passage for any vehicles for example. And since it is know there are probably more South Korea constantly drills around the DMZ to find more and has set up seismological instruments to discover further ones as they are being built.

I read a paper by a US Major Allen Reece (looking for tactical information on tunnel warfare, only found strategic), written in 1997 about this.

He decided that the tunnels will give the NK forces an initial advantage, but they aren't a game winner, and would fairly soon will be countered by ROK and US forces. The defenders will not know where the attackers will emerge, which is a real problem, but once they've been committed revealed, the advantage has been lost.

He also says that's there seems to be doctrinal weakness in the US military about tunnel warfare (might have been corrected by now), and that they really don't want to try fighting in the tunnels themselves (can't see why they'd try that, myself).

You think that with things like aerial ground penetrating RADAR and advanced reflection seismology that can create detailed 3D images of exactly whats under your feet that they do not know where the tunnels are? They are almost certainly aware of where most of them are and most likely plan to either ambush the forces as they emerge or wait until the North Korean forces are streaming through and collapse them.

Quaxar:

Why the heck would the Seoulians (?) stand around in an artillery bombing and look at all the pretty shells for half an hour? The Seoul area has bunkers that can hold approximately 60% of the area's population and they are well maintained and not exactly a secret. And while Seoul is pretty close to the DMZ it is actually far enough away that only the DPRK's biggest artillery and MLRs can reach it and by far not all of them are positioned along the DMZ since that would leave a huge border open. And retaliation fire from ROK artillery ready in minutes slows their already slow rate of fire even more down.
Only going by artillery and ignoring ballistic missiles and the like of course.

Also, while the DPRK has built tunnels since the 70s that could provide a route for a few thousand KPA soldiers per hour and there are believed to be several unknown ones left it's not like they can have a successful invasion just because their infantry can circumvent the minefield. None of the four known ones are big enough to allow passage for any vehicles for example. And since it is know there are probably more South Korea constantly drills around the DMZ to find more and has set up seismological instruments to discover further ones as they are being built.

Where do you get 5:1? Considering the DPRK has 1 million while at agreement with the ROK the standing USFK are no more than 28,500 it's more of a 1:35 ratio. Still, comparing armies in pure numbers or pretending like without the small local US forces the South would fall like a drunk tightrope walking bear isn't really modern. The North fails on pretty much all areas vital for modern combat and especially advancing into enemy territory, except of course having more people to waste.
And I dare say I trust military tactical analysts more than heresay over five corners.

Seoul will be paralyzed with artillery and unable to move until US forces remove the well fortified artillery. If the North Korean army has MLRS the bunkers will be rendered meaningless (I only say that because that was my old job).

I get 5 to 1 because that is the number of North Korean Commandos that will over run the US position that those soldiers told me. I asked to go to Korea, then they would take me aside (Those that served in Korea) and explain to me what the expectations are. Once I arrive and until I leave on the plane, I'm dead. That is my life expectancy on the battlefield. The US forces on the Peninsula are merely there as a number to get enough sympathy to get the congress to deploy our Pacific forces.

We may both be arm chair generals at this point.

Trust your experts, I will trust those that were expected to die, those that served alongside me in combat.

waj9876:
Pretty sure China has already stated they won't be backing N. Korea if they instigate the conflict. They'll help defend N. Korea in the event they are attacked, but not the other way around. And the way China has been acting lately is like a sober wingman slowly backing away from his drunk friend screaming about how he'll kill everyone in the room. For lack of a funnier analogy on my part. (It's REALLY late.)

I think it's a very good analogy, actually.

DPRK is one of those guys who does exactly as you said, and seems serious enough when he does it, but the next day when you confront him about it he says "dude, I was joking! WTF is wrong with you guys? Jeesh ... I'm not freakin' crazy" before following with "hey can I borrow $20 for petrol/lunch?"

DPRK is that shitty cousin who you only even talk to because you have the same grandmother and you have to see them at Christmas time. When he tells you ad nauseum about all kinds of military hardware, different military tactics, and the rigours of military training .... despite being a fat fuck on the dole who hasn't so much as called a recruiter let alone gone through boot camp. But his bedroom walls are plastered in army recruitment/promotional posters.

i am actually surprised we got out the cold war sometimes with so few real threats from former satellite states and without it going into Dr. Strangelove territory.

people forget things like the Gorbachev kidnapping and attempted coup...or that one guy who stopped a nuclear torpedo being fired during the Cuban missile crisis...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasili_Arkhipov

i think NK are pretty locked up tight tho.

aelreth:
Seoul will be paralyzed with artillery and unable to move until US forces remove the well fortified artillery. If the North Korean army has MLRS the bunkers will be rendered meaningless (I only say that because that was my old job).

Couldn't agree less.

I should correct myself, most MRLs are actually not in range of Seoul, being mostly of old Soviet design with a range of about half needed for Seoul. I also don't see how MRLs the calibre of the BM-21 are supposed to bust modern underground bunkers in an urban environment but I couldn't really find much on the BM-21's firepower so it's just a guess.
Anyway, the biggest DPRK artillery is the Koksan and, considering Seoul is about 40km from the DMZ, which is 5km across, plus the fact that many HART positions are another 5-10km inland, even they are pushed to their 60km rocket-assisted-projectile (RAP) range limit and can only get to some northern outskirts of the Greater Seoul Area, which are far less densely populated. The approximately 700 in range also have a sustained firing rate of 1 every 3-5 minutes and don't store any or hardly any ammo with themselves, so repositioning them out of their established base to escape destruction by the South could be a logistical nightmare for the KPA.
Plus some 240mm MRLs with a very meagre 35km top range could make the way if already in good positions. Plus theoretically a few hundred long-range missiles convertible for the necessary range that would be utterly wasted if used for a strike against Seoul.

This is an approximation of the anticipated Koksan and 240 MRL maximum range fans, excluding possible firing angle restrictions and massive shadows provided by the mountainous terrain:
image

And I think it's kind of offensive how little you expect of ROK military. They have a huge military themselves, including counter-batteries ready to retaliate in less than 15 minutes in the worst case and a lot of pre-done target calculations for the big number of known HARTs.
The DPRK's positions are far from well fortified, if only for geographical reasons, and even if they are their massive dud rate of 25%, badly trained operators, awful supply capability and possibly far from good maintainance are not exactly a plus for them. Historical estimations point towards ROK forces destroying at least 1% of enemy artillery per hour. Not incuding air strikes through the Swiss cheese that is DPRK air defense.

The ROK also has prepared and frequently trains big scenarios like moving massive forces northward through the South Seoul supply corridor, while the DPRK, as far as we know, has never attempted any really massive troop movements and is more than likely not even capable of anything in the scale of what would be necessary to advance.

US forces are vital for continuous support but the South is more than capable of handling the situation themselves for quite some time if needed be.

aelreth:
I get 5 to 1 because that is the number of North Korean Commandos that will over run the US position that those soldiers told me. I asked to go to Korea, then they would take me aside (Those that served in Korea) and explain to me what the expectations are. Once I arrive and until I leave on the plane, I'm dead. That is my life expectancy on the battlefield. The US forces on the Peninsula are merely there as a number to get enough sympathy to get the congress to deploy our Pacific forces.

I don't know what "North Korean Commandos" are supposed to entail exactly but considering the DPRK only has about 200.000 Special Forces Units, of which they can only move 4000 per air at a time, I suppose you mean mostly regular soldiers coming through tunnels.
Badly trained, badly armed, half-starved infantry that walks directly into a multitude of sensor arrays and guard posts and that, for geographical reasons mentioned already above, can't really avoid populated areas if they want to advance efficiently. Even less if they manage to get vehicles through an unknown bigger tunnel.

And I gotta say if US Camps get hit it's your own damned fault for building so many facilities so close to the DMZ they are easily inside even smaller DPRK artillery's firing ranges.

aelreth:
Trust your experts, I will trust those that were expected to die, those that served alongside me in combat.

I base a lot of my range numbers and some tactical scenarios on this report, originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop in late 2011, compiled by Roger Cavazos, who served as a tactical, operational and strategic specialist in the US Army for 22 years with the last decade focused on China and the DPRK, and an associate of and frequent writer for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.

If you think possibly exaggerated and certainly somewhat biased stories from common soldiers can even begin to compare to the detailed analysis of a specialist who has followed and studied the situation on the Korean Peninsula up close for a decade and more that's up to you.

Quaxar:

aelreth:
Seoul will be paralyzed with artillery and unable to move until US forces remove the well fortified artillery. If the North Korean army has MLRS the bunkers will be rendered meaningless (I only say that because that was my old job).

Couldn't agree less.

I should correct myself, most MRLs are actually not in range of Seoul, being mostly of old Soviet design with a range of about half needed for Seoul. I also don't see how MRLs the calibre of the BM-21 are supposed to bust modern underground bunkers in an urban environment but I couldn't really find much on the BM-21's firepower so it's just a guess.
Anyway, the biggest DPRK artillery is the Koksan and, considering Seoul is about 40km from the DMZ, which is 5km across, plus the fact that many HART positions are another 5-10km inland, even they are pushed to their 60km rocket-assisted-projectile (RAP) range limit and can only get to some northern outskirts of the Greater Seoul Area, which are far less densely populated. The approximately 700 in range also have a sustained firing rate of 1 every 3-5 minutes and don't store any or hardly any ammo with themselves, so repositioning them out of their established base to escape destruction by the South could be a logistical nightmare for the KPA.
Plus some 240mm MRLs with a very meagre 35km top range could make the way if already in good positions. Plus theoretically a few hundred long-range missiles convertible for the necessary range that would be utterly wasted if used for a strike against Seoul.

This is an approximation of the anticipated Koksan and 240 MRL maximum range fans, excluding possible firing angle restrictions and massive shadows provided by the mountainous terrain:
image

And I think it's kind of offensive how little you expect of ROK military. They have a huge military themselves, including counter-batteries ready to retaliate in less than 15 minutes in the worst case and a lot of pre-done target calculations for the big number of known HARTs.
The DPRK's positions are far from well fortified, if only for geographical reasons, and even if they are their massive dud rate of 25%, badly trained operators, awful supply capability and possibly far from good maintainance are not exactly a plus for them. Historical estimations point towards ROK forces destroying at least 1% of enemy artillery per hour. Not incuding air strikes through the Swiss cheese that is DPRK air defense.

The ROK also has prepared and frequently trains big scenarios like moving massive forces northward through the South Seoul supply corridor, while the DPRK, as far as we know, has never attempted any really massive troop movements and is more than likely not even capable of anything in the scale of what would be necessary to advance.

US forces are vital for continuous support but the South is more than capable of handling the situation themselves for quite some time if needed be.

aelreth:
I get 5 to 1 because that is the number of North Korean Commandos that will over run the US position that those soldiers told me. I asked to go to Korea, then they would take me aside (Those that served in Korea) and explain to me what the expectations are. Once I arrive and until I leave on the plane, I'm dead. That is my life expectancy on the battlefield. The US forces on the Peninsula are merely there as a number to get enough sympathy to get the congress to deploy our Pacific forces.

I don't know what "North Korean Commandos" are supposed to entail exactly but considering the DPRK only has about 200.000 Special Forces Units, of which they can only move 4000 per air at a time, I suppose you mean mostly regular soldiers coming through tunnels.
Badly trained, badly armed, half-starved infantry that walks directly into a multitude of sensor arrays and guard posts and that, for geographical reasons mentioned already above, can't really avoid populated areas if they want to advance efficiently. Even less if they manage to get vehicles through an unknown bigger tunnel.

And I gotta say if US Camps get hit it's your own damned fault for building so many facilities so close to the DMZ they are easily inside even smaller DPRK artillery's firing ranges.

aelreth:
Trust your experts, I will trust those that were expected to die, those that served alongside me in combat.

I base a lot of my range numbers and some tactical scenarios on this report, originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop in late 2011, compiled by Roger Cavazos, who served as a tactical, operational and strategic specialist in the US Army for 22 years with the last decade focused on China and the DPRK, and an associate of and frequent writer for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.

If you think possibly exaggerated and certainly somewhat biased stories from common soldiers can even begin to compare to the detailed analysis of a specialist who has followed and studied the situation on the Korean Peninsula up close for a decade and more that's up to you.

That would make sense, the last time those guys had their briefings was in 01 and 02, before he likely came into his position.
The unit they were in had no protection greater than vehicles that could negate small arms fire. They were battalion in strength.

I would like to note that if the drafts of this report in prior years had made it to the Bush White house, I would have guessed an attack would taken place. Yet they didn't.

As for the the ROK Army, if they were capable of not needing our assistance it would be in their political best interests to tell us to get lost, the President would be VERY HAPPY to take more troops home. Yet they don't.

Suddenly it makes sense why they didn't keep him for a full 30.

They've done this before as well. They've never official recognized the treaty, so their "tearing it up" means nothing. They've also "torn up" the treaty three times in the past.

They're not going to have a war. At worst, they'll shell an island or two. Likely, they'll re-engage in a bit of terrorism against South Korea and Japan. But a war? The leaders are not suicidal.

Korolev:
They've done this before as well. They've never official recognized the treaty, so their "tearing it up" means nothing. They've also "torn up" the treaty three times in the past.

They're not going to have a war. At worst, they'll shell an island or two. Likely, they'll re-engage in a bit of terrorism against South Korea and Japan. But a war? The leaders are not suicidal.

We don't really know that much of N. Korea's new leader, he might be crazy enough to end the world if he buys his own hype. Its probably more of the same, but this would be a bad time for Jr. to decide he wants to be different from his father.

Even if they did intend on doing this, they would be decimated by the rest of the world. Nobody wants nukes to drop again.

Shaoken:

Korolev:
They've done this before as well. They've never official recognized the treaty, so their "tearing it up" means nothing. They've also "torn up" the treaty three times in the past.

They're not going to have a war. At worst, they'll shell an island or two. Likely, they'll re-engage in a bit of terrorism against South Korea and Japan. But a war? The leaders are not suicidal.

We don't really know that much of N. Korea's new leader, he might be crazy enough to end the world if he buys his own hype. Its probably more of the same, but this would be a bad time for Jr. to decide he wants to be different from his father.

Agreed. I think a lot of people are underestimating what N. Korea will do. Kim Jong Un might just decided that a course of action is the best way to start off his leadership. Regardless of whether or not we can step in and end it quickly, the fact is: Somebody is probably going to get hurt. Another point is, would our country even step in and help in that case? Or would we even need to?

cjspyres:

Shaoken:

Korolev:
They've done this before as well. They've never official recognized the treaty, so their "tearing it up" means nothing. They've also "torn up" the treaty three times in the past.

They're not going to have a war. At worst, they'll shell an island or two. Likely, they'll re-engage in a bit of terrorism against South Korea and Japan. But a war? The leaders are not suicidal.

We don't really know that much of N. Korea's new leader, he might be crazy enough to end the world if he buys his own hype. Its probably more of the same, but this would be a bad time for Jr. to decide he wants to be different from his father.

Agreed. I think a lot of people are underestimating what N. Korea will do. Kim Jong Un might just decided that a course of action is the best way to start off his leadership. Regardless of whether or not we can step in and end it quickly, the fact is: Somebody is probably going to get hurt. Another point is, would our country even step in and help in that case? Or would we even need to?

I do not believe that Kim Jong Un is in charge of his country. I find it hard to believe that his generals would have just allowed the son to take up the mantle of the father so completely.

I suspect he is a figurehead to at least give the impression of a simple pyramid of corruption, rather than the convoluted webs I am certain the NK brass have going on.

Abomination:

cjspyres:

Shaoken:

We don't really know that much of N. Korea's new leader, he might be crazy enough to end the world if he buys his own hype. Its probably more of the same, but this would be a bad time for Jr. to decide he wants to be different from his father.

Agreed. I think a lot of people are underestimating what N. Korea will do. Kim Jong Un might just decided that a course of action is the best way to start off his leadership. Regardless of whether or not we can step in and end it quickly, the fact is: Somebody is probably going to get hurt. Another point is, would our country even step in and help in that case? Or would we even need to?

I do not believe that Kim Jong Un is in charge of his country. I find it hard to believe that his generals would have just allowed the son to take up the mantle of the father so completely.

I suspect he is a figurehead to at least give the impression of a simple pyramid of corruption, rather than the convoluted webs I am certain the NK brass have going on.

This is always a possibility, actually it's most likely true. Honestly, whatever part of N. Korea was a dictatorship, now seems to be turning into a military junta. Just my opinion though.

Abomination:

cjspyres:

Shaoken:

We don't really know that much of N. Korea's new leader, he might be crazy enough to end the world if he buys his own hype. Its probably more of the same, but this would be a bad time for Jr. to decide he wants to be different from his father.

Agreed. I think a lot of people are underestimating what N. Korea will do. Kim Jong Un might just decided that a course of action is the best way to start off his leadership. Regardless of whether or not we can step in and end it quickly, the fact is: Somebody is probably going to get hurt. Another point is, would our country even step in and help in that case? Or would we even need to?

I do not believe that Kim Jong Un is in charge of his country. I find it hard to believe that his generals would have just allowed the son to take up the mantle of the father so completely.

I suspect he is a figurehead to at least give the impression of a simple pyramid of corruption, rather than the convoluted webs I am certain the NK brass have going on.

Actually, when the new Kim came to power there were heavy rearrangements in the military leadership to prevent exactly that and fill the important positions with his supporters.

That isn't to say he is in charge, he's still more figure than a leader and certainly not getting to start a war if the military heads don't agree.

North Korea is an idiot.

Agema:
NK has no intention of ripping up the ceasefire.

It's just playing brinkmanship to see whether it can push SK/USA to back down and hand it some free aid money instead.

Spot on!

image

Ok I found a absolutely incredible document on this:
http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=104335

Its a long Document so I will C+P the Conclusion, and if you didn't read the whole thing... then either ignore the entire post or assume its correct. Preferably the former, (even more preferably, read it).

V. Conclusion

In this paper, we have seen how the North Korean economy moves in a business cycle. We could find a model amid the seemingly chaotic movement of the North Korean economy over time. We could vaguely confirm that the North's business cycle, albeit undergoing somewhat bizarre processes and hardships, has a unique, repeating rhythm and that it would not be easy for the North Korean regime to jump out of this model after 2012, as it could not before 2012 (North Korean system's inertia to maintain the status quo and China's influence), and therefore both of the two extreme theories predicting "North Korea's collapse" and "North Korea's change," respectively, reflect quite subjective convictions.

Accordingly, those who believe North Korea recently attempted to make qualitative moves to break away from the existing "system" or fundamentally reform it, as well as those who think they have detected such signals, have yet to grasp the North Korean economy's business cycle, which repeats itself according to a certain pattern.

This study also examined why the debate continues about changes in North Korea, including reform and opening-up, outside of the isolated state, despite strong denials and objections by its leadership. By elucidating how North Korea has overcome crisis situations and what role China has played in the process, this paper has revealed certain limitations inherent in not only the theory of "regime collapse" but also that of "change and reform."

As of September 2012, North Korea is in a serious bottom of its business cycle. Actually, taking an unknown course of reform and openness could further worsen the already dire situation. In this regard, it would still be quite rash to talk about North Korea's change on the basis of its "June 28 guidelines," the exact content of which has yet to be known.

Also, in view of the characteristics of its social formation, reform and opening-up can be a very perilous choice for North Korea. In North Korea, where the ruling elite monopolizes surpluses through a plundering system, change and reform will clash with the interests of the upper echelon in its social structure (a collusive structure of elites) in the short, medium and long run. Paradoxically, China's resources allow North Korea to avoid change and reform. This is all the more ironic, considering that China has often expressed its intention to induce the North into its own model of reform and openness. Within China, this is called the "economic reform diplomacy."

In addition, this study shed light on the "cognitive circuits" among South Korean experts that perceive North Korean leaders' visits to China as signals of reform and openness. A case in point was their perception of Kim Jong-il's praise of the Chinese-style reform and openness, which he called "cataclysmic changes," during his tour of Shanghai.

In this respect, we looked into the "timing" of the North Korean leadership's visits to China with extra caution in Part IV. We found that North Korean leaders' China visits generally took place immediately before or after business cycle bottoms, and that around the time of their visits the North tended to issue instructions, such as "July 1 measures," "June 28 guidelines" and "Hwanggumpyong project." These events have stoked speculations about impending reform and opening-up in North Korea, which are based on optical illusions, or benign assumptions. This is the reason we need to look at the timing of these events in line with the North Korean economy's business cycle.

? = "

I can't be bothered to correct them all ¬.¬

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